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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE ST'A T~ OF UTAH
BETH F. DRURY,

Plaintiff and Reszwndent,

--VS. -

l'OT1LE~N

LUNCEFORD,

Case
No.10466

Defendant and Appellant.

AP·PELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
The case on appeal herein involves the question of
1Yhether or not it is error for a trial judge to enter an
order, upon ph1intiff 's motion, vacating his own prior
unconditional orcler granting a new trial to defendant
npon ih.; motion seeking the new trial.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The a1>ove-captioned case was tried before the Hononililc Maurice Harding, Judge of the Fourth Judicial
Distrirt Court, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of the c\-idence Judge Harding granted judgment in
favoi" of plaintiff ancl against defendant for the sum of
1

$2,126.20, representing $126.20 special dama
gcs a11''
$2,000 general damages. Several days later
,
.
.
' anc1 a11
parently upon his own motion, the trial J·ndge en tPr~,1
his • "Reconsideration" granting plaintiff J. 1!(lgmP\tt
agamst defendant for the sum of $4 ' 926.20 reprcs en t'111,,
l'pecial
damages in the sum of $126 ·20 and geneI''"l
l " (am.
ages in the sum of $4,800.
Thereafter, the trial judge granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial and subsequently granted defcnrlant 's motion for an order setting aside his pre1'iou~
order granting a new trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT
The relief sought on appeal is as follows: ReYersal
of the judgment of the lower court remanding the ease
to the District Court for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

This case arises out of an automobile accident which
occurred on or about April 1, 1964, at or near the inter- ,
section of 1280 North Street and 500 West Street in
Provo, Utah County, Utah. (R-2, T-31) A complaint
was filed by plaintiff seeking judgment against defendant for medical expenses and general damages for per1
sonal injuries. (R-3, 4) The matter was tried on Fehruary 15 1965 before the Honorable Maurice Harding,
. '
'
Judge of the District Court of Utah County. (R-17) },t
the conclusion of the evidence after both sides had rest2

ed. arnl after having argument by counsel for both parlie!', tlw (~onrt fonnd the issues in favor of plaintiff and

ngaiust defendant and awarded damages as follows:
~ 11 cci:tl damages, $126.20 and general damages, $2,000
(H-17). A mi11ute entry was entered pursuant to the
( 'onrt's order.

On Fehrnary 17, 1965, apparently on the Court's
0 ,rn motion .Tud~e Harding entered his "Reconsideration" inrrensing the judgment by awarding plaintiff
spceial damages iu the sum of $126.20 and general damages in the snm of $4,800.
In Mc·onlnnce ·with the "Reconsideration" referred
10 jndgmP11t was entered on March 5, 1965. (R-24)

On
~f rirc·h 2, 1065, (lefendant by her attorneys, made a Motio11 for a new trial. The basis of the motion was that
the (a) rornlnct of the Court in increasing the general
dnmap;es hy its "Reconsideration" upon its own motion
was a man if est injustice to defendant, and (b) the incrrased damages awarded by the Court in its "Reconsi(lerntion" upon its own motion was excessive and not
in accordance with the evidence presented (R-22).
At the hearing of defendant's Motion, the court
.~tAtecl from the hench that it had previously advised
ro1msd for plaintiff, prior to the issuance of the "ReconsiJrrr1tion,'' if defendant filed a motion for new trial
11oc<nh<' of th0 iurrease in the general damages the Motiun ;'-'Cll11<1 he gr::mted.
A 11 orclrr ~~ranting defendant a new trial was entPn•rl 11.'· .J\l(1ge Harc1i11g on May 4, 1965. (R-25)
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Shortly after the entry of the Court's Order
grai1t
ing a new trial, plaintiff, by her attornev made
",
a rn1,.
tion for an order setting aside the Court's order· O'
t'lrai11
ing the new trial. (R-28) On September 8, 1965, 111 "
Court granted plaintiff's Motion and made the follu\\
ing specific findings in relation thereto:
1. There were no ~rregularities in the proreedin~,
of the Court or either of the parties during \Ji 1,
trial, and the Court did not abuse its discretiu 11
whereby either party was prevented from haYiiw
a fair trial.
'
2. There was no accident or surprise which orrlinary prudence could have guarded against at tJ 1,,
trial.
3. There is no newly discovered evidence material
for the party making the application, whirh he
could not, with reasonable dili~ence have di~co1ered and produced at the trial.
4. That the damages were not excesesive, the
Court ~pecifically finding that it is of the opinion
that the damages awarded by the Court on \hi>
matter are entirely reasonable.
5. That there is not insufficient evidence to justify
the amount of damages awarded, and that the nrdict of the Court is not against the law.

6. That there have been no errors in law in \hr
trial.
The order and judgment setting forth the abo-re findin~~
is found at R-32, 33, 34.
E is from the Court's order setting aside its pnvious order for a new trial and the jndgme11t in the
case that this appeal is taken.
4

ARGUl\IENT
POIN11 I
'fflli~ 'l'lUAL COURT ERRED IN RECONSIDJ1;HTNG T11 8 DECISION UPON ITS O"WN
!\WTTON.

After the parties had presented evidence in an ef-

fort to support their respective contentions and after
r·ounsf'l fnr the parties hall completed argument to the
('n11rt the 1'rial .Tndge orally announced his decision in
fornr of plClintiff Clnd against defendant for the sum of
~~,l~G.20. This amount represented special damages of
$1~1120 nncl genNal dnmagcs of $2,000.00 (R-17, T-37).
'J'he oral decision of the Trial Judge and the Minute
EntrY th1•re011 was made on February 15, 1965. Two
dn:rs lnter, on February 17, 1966, apparently on his
own motion, the Trial .Judge entered his "Reconsideratio!i '' of the matter and increased the general damages
lie lrncl iweYiously awarded to plaintiff from $2,000.00
to $+,800.00.

Jn ihe instaHt ease and in all cases tried before a
jlHlg·r'. sittinr: without a jury, the trial judge takes the
pl<H'P of the jury and beeomes one who hears and con~iclPrs the· r'.·iclenee, finds facts, determines liability, compntcs n11a ~isscssep, damag-es, if any. In such cases the
trial .1nrl::i:0 performs a dual function; he adopts rules of
h1· Lr his g11irb n<'<' arnl finds facts as guided by those
rnlPs. Hrn11rhi , •. flrnholm & JJ!ck. Co., 302 Mass. 469,
10 ~ K 2<1, Gf)7, 121 AT__.R 460. See also 53 Am. Jnr.
Trinl ' 112:1. \ ltl1ough the Court is generally granted
5

greater latitude in the reception of eviden ·,
.
.
.
ce 1.1 111111
J~ry trials a~1d l~l the ~vay the trial is conducted, l'''f'l
tially, the tnal Judge is to conduct himsplf a, . ·
,
•
;; cl ]\\1'1q
would after havmg heard evidence on the matter .. ,
• •'-1
Am. Jnr., Trials §§ 1125, 1128.
Inasmuch as appellant could find no
point assigned as error, other than from
1Vashington, it will outline the standard to
must adhere in this matter and conte11cl
judge must govern himself according)~cases.

law 011 tli\,
the State of
which juror,
tlrn t a trrni
·
in non-jun

Jurors are allowed all reasonable opportunitY 1wfore the verdict is put on record and they are discharg-ri!,
to ascertain the facts and determine the amount of tl1eir
m~rnrd if one is warranted. Before they are dismisse1l
as jurors from the case, their power over the venlict
remains and they haYe the right to alter it so as to ro11form to the real intention and purpose. Rino \'. rre11lmizen, 141 Wash. 18, 250 P. 450, Stephr:ns v. Drap11.
350 P. 2d 506 (Okla.). Before it has hern dischargei.l
from the case a jury may reconsider its venlict and maki'
corrections as to damages. Daniels v. Celeste, 303 ~[ass.,
148, 21 N.E. 2d 1. See the annotation at 49 ALR ~ 1 l
1339-1341.
However, it is generally held that after the jnn·
has been permanently discharged from a case, tlwy cannot be reassembled to amend or correct their yenlid
as to a matter of substance. Regf'inger v. Sliielrl, lli-1
"\"Vash. 147, P. 2d 681.

6

111

tlw

('ClSC

of Fa1111er ,.. TVilkoskee, 123 Mont. 228,

+20, 11 A LR :M :l18, the rourt indicated that
tlll' time for coneC'ting- an insfficient verdict is at the
titnl' ii is a1111om1rec1 in open ronrt and before it has been
ilf'Cl'Jltecl :rnd onlPr0<l fih'cl for record and before the
i 11 r>· li:1s ],een disrharged from the case.
~1 !

P.

~<l

Wlrnt tlie ronds g0nerally mean is that a jury can1111( lie rrnssemJ,Jed to amend or correct their verdirt
;is to a matter of snhstane0 if the amendment requires
n•con:,idNation of the iss1ws by the jury. Settle v .
. iiisa11, 8 Ga. 201,, :i2 Am. Dec. 393. Also see the annota ti n11 at f1G A LR i'i;)9.
T1 i-.; nppellant 's contention that the Trial Judge in

a 11011-.inr:· ca"e as the trier of the fact takes the place of
the jury and therefore by analogy may not reconsider
his decision once he has given it and certainly may not
110 so where the am0rnlment to his decision requires a
rPcnmideratio11 of th0 evid0nc0 presented and the issues
inrnln'r1. C'ertainl:r he may not do so upon his own
motinn as was done in the instant.
One .inrisdif't ion, ancl the only jurisdiction decidingtl1is C]l1P,dio11 ac«onling to appellant's research, has inrlifArd tl1e co11har~- to what appellant asserts herein.
Ill Ritt, 1 Y. Jnli11so11, 168 ·wash. 153, 300 P. 518 (1931)
l'.l ,\LR 1:110, the Conrt declared that the trial court
':ttirn;· wi1hollt a jnr:· ma:· change a decision orally an11111w·"d on tliP nierits before judgment has been e11tr•n•1l tl1ere>on.
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POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SETTT\ 1
ASIDE ITS UNCONDITIONAL OR ', '.
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S l\IOTION Fon;.L
NEW TRIAL.
\
Rule 59, Utah Rules of CiYil Procedure pro,·i1Jes a,
follows:
(a) Grounds. Subject to the proYisions nf
Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or 311 y
of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for
any of the following causes; proYided, howeYr1c
that on a motion for a new trial in an action tri 0it
without a jury, the court may open the judgment
if one has been entered, take additional testimom.
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law~:
make new findings and conclusions, and direct t!11·
entry of a new judgment:

(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the
court, jury or adverse party, or any order of thr
court, or abuse of discretion by which either
party was prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jnry; and \rhenerrr
any one er more of the jurors have been induce1!
to assent to any general or special verdict, or to
a finding on any question submitted to them Jiy .
the court, by resort to a determination by chanrr
or as a result of bribery, such misconduct ma;
be proved by the affidavit of any one of tl1r
jurors.
( 3) Accident or surprise, "·hich orclinan
prudence could not haYe guarded against.
( 4) N ewlv disco ye red evidence, ma tt>rial for
the party making the application, which he could
not with reasonable dilence, have disrowrr·il
and' produced at the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadeqnnte <lamage~, ap-

8

peari11g- to have hren given under the influence
of passion or prejudice.
( G) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify
the ''erclict or other decision, or that it is against
la\V.
(7) Error in law.

It will be noted ilia t the trial court may grant a new

trial for, among other reasons, (a) irregularity in the
pro('Prdi11gs of the court, (b) error in law.
:'\ppellant contends tbat it was an irregularity in
the proceedings in the action of the trial judge announcinr-; his oral decision from the bench on the day of the
trial aml then two days later, on his own motion, after
haYing mulled the evidence over in his mind and reconoiclerc:d tl1e eYidence and the issues having increased the
i;rnrral damages award.eel hy approximately 240%. It
is certaill that the trial judge thought this was an irregularitv for he advised counsel for plaintiff that after his
increase in the general damages, if counsel for defendant moYed for a new trial the motion would he granted.
,~ new trial was granted and appellant contends that
the trial jndge was correct in granting it.

Tu gnmting or refusing a motion for a new trial,
thr trial court may exercise its sound discretion which
thr lo.;;inr,; party may invoke in light of the whole pro1·0t'1liL~s i11 the case.
J,a1r'

Y.

i;{mdh, 34 U. 394, 98 P. 300. See also Soltas v.

-Ufluk, 99 F. :181, 105 P. 2d 176. It is axiomatic in this
'l'1Ll~ (hut ,si,Tnnti11g or refusing of motions for new trials
i::; n '1iscrdional'Y matter. Uptown Appliance & Radio

Co., Inc., v. Flint, 122 U. 298, 249 P. 2d 82(). 11 0 ,,. 0\ _l'j

is true that the trial court has no discretion to ,.,J<111t
"" ,
new trial absent a showing of one of the O'J'Ollllll" ,
M

'

.

'Pl'I

fied in Rule 59. Tangaro v. llla11ero, 1:) F. 2d 290
P. 2d 390.

·_i-

, •Ii

In this regard appellant respectfully assert, tli:i'
the trial judge had basis for granting the 1ww tri:i1 I'!
the following grounds, Rule 59 (a) (1) (5) (fi) (7). T\ 11
basis under Rule 59 (a) (1) (6) and (i) hri11g that i:
was an irregularit~r on the proceedings hy thr trial rom:
and even in law for the court to reconsidrr the eYir]p 111 ,
and issues on its own motion and to cha11g-e it8 on1i
decision. In Rule 59 (a) ( 5) the increase on the genn;1i
damages of 240% certainly appears to hm-e hee11 giw1
under the influence of passion.
In relation to the granting of d0fendant's motin1!
for a new trial, it should be noted that the court'H orrler
granting the new trial was unconditional. Haying hcm"l
and unconditionally granted defendant's motion for 1
new trial it was error for the trial court to entertniJ1
plaintiff's motion to vacate its prior ord<>r g-nrnting 1111
new trial. In the proceedings in the lower conrt 111aintiff
did not petition the con rt for a r0hearing on defrnda11! 'motion for a ne"- trial but made a new sPparatl' n1111
distinct motion to Yacate a prior uncomlitional onl1" 1
the court. Appellant contends it was error for the comi
11

to hear plaintiff's motion and to grant it.

o·
l· 11 r-.

vVhether the court ma~- reconsider an ordl'l' grn 11 t
or denvin
O' an ap11lica ti on for a 1ww tria 1 if' a quef,
b
~

10

1

:joii
1

,1

11

:iw

fn·qne11tly been considered by the eourts
\-; 11 ious jnrisc!ictious. 111 some jurisclictio11s, Utah

JiJl'li

Ji;1.-.;

1l1r trinl court is held not to lrnYc the power
i'r•oiwn tl1(' tfr1l after once clisposi11g of it. Lukr , ..
111
l'u/, 111 a11 • ;)R, litali :18:1, 113 P. 1023, Broic11i11g Y. Hoffiiwliirkil.

W. Va. 4G8, 103 S:E~ 484, ]fiddlPfon Y. Finney,
('ol ;):2:3 GP. 2(1 0:)8, 78 ALR 1104; United R. ('o. Y.

:Hlll, t)f)

~l.J.

s1111

1

rior

et.,

J10 Col 755, 131 P. 129. See also the anno-

t:dions at 14] ALR 4-01 aml 61 ALR2d 647. That fou11dalio11 of 1lie rult> is that the modPs in which a decision

1m1,- hr rn-iPwPcl are prescribed hy statute, and the
r r.n1rl~ :1l'P unt at lilwrty to substitute other modes in
tl1Pir pince. J,uke ,._ Coleman, op. cit. Another reason is

tliere mnst he some point where litigation in the
l1111·1·r ronrt tPrmi1wtPs and the losing party is turned
nn'r to the aPJwllate court for redress. See 39 Am .•Jur.,
:\ e1\' Trials ~ 20(), p. 202.
;]Jd

Tt seems clear that a trial court may modify or
rnl'ate its enrnlitional order for a new trial. National
P11 rn11r.~ T"11io11 Pro /)f'rf.11 and c as 11alty r O/ll /Ja11.lf v.
T1' 11 1}/;1wm, 4 U2d I, 286 P. 2d 249 (1955), Harris v.
Spn J's. :J;> l1. 474, 181-i P 445 (1920).
Jn 111!.-e v. eole11iau an action was commenced in the
\'it~ ~'om1 of Sa1t Lake City to recoyer judgment
l!.;.1[11,..t (1el"t•11ila11t on a promissory note. A judgment
,.,;1' .!.!:nrn1 ·d :1p:ni11st (lcfondant and he appealed to the
Di~triet C'omt of ~alt Lake Comity. At the de 110'\'0 trial
iii tk Dist rid ( 'ourt before a jury a ,·erclict and ju<lg'11"1lt ""(·l'u n1t1·red in fayor of defendant and against
1

11

plaintiff, no couse of action. Shortlv thercaftrr 1 · .
·
· P a1111:i
filed a motion for a new trial in the District Court : ..
\\ 111,'
was heard and denied. After this deninl plai 11 t 1·t'f
•
]111
honed and moved the court to grm1t a rrhParinr; ,11 il
reargument of plaintiff's motion for a nrw trial. Ili
fenclant thereupon filed a motion to strik<' plaiiit11 1·
petition for a rehearing on the ground of lack of inri,
diction of the court. The court heard plaintiff's p1·!il; 11 ,
and denied it.
One of the questions on appeal in this matter i:
volved the propriety of the court hearing plai11ti1r.
motion for a rehearing on his original motion for a 11 ,...
trial because of the time element for appeal.
In discussing the plaintiff's motion for a rrheari11,
on its original motion for a new trial and dne to tlP
court's denial of same the Supreme Court said at m r.
1024:
We think the District Court had no po-wer trr
e!1tertain such a motion. It is unknown to onr pra('tice. In Cnlifornia, where the practice rrlati11~
to new trials is similar to ours it has been fil1llh
established that the Court has no power to rco1w11
the question of granting or denying a motion for
a new trial. Hi11tum vs. Greif, 144 Cal. 521, iS
Pac. 11; Carpenter vs. Supreme Ct., 75 Col. :i~IG.
19 Pnc. l7 4; Rgan vs. Egan, 90 Ca 1. 1.5, 27 Pnr. 2~:
Long vs. Superior Ct. 71 Cal. 481, 12 l'nr. :)ni:.
416; Coombs vs. Hibher, 43 Col. 452.
In acting with approval from the Jlaltum

Y.

r:rrl·

case, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
The decisions of this court arC' numerous a111 i
uniform to the effect that n judgmC'nt or order 011 '"

1

, eanlarlY 011terwl ca11 be reviewed and set aside
in the mocks prescribed by statute. If thev
]J;i\:,. hrrn rntc>recl prematurly, or hy inadvertenc;,
tltev mar lw ~;et aside on the proper showing (Odd
"B'rlls' S~v. Bank v. Deuprey, 66 Cal. 170 [ 4 Pac.
1173] and cases cited), and if the order as enterrd is not the order as made, the minutes may be
r11rrerte<l so as to make them speak the truth (Garoutte , .. Hale)·, 104 Cal. 497 [38 Pac. 194] and
rases cited) ; but subject to these exceptions the
ordC'f is reviewahle only on appeal, and the deeision of the trial court having been once made
11fter regular submission of the motion, its power
is exhausted - it is function officio.
; 111] ,

The Utah case of National Farmers Union Property
a111l ('us11alty Company Y.

Thompson, op cit, is not con-

trolling- ill tlw i11stanee because it involves a different
prohlrm than the case on appeal herein. In that case an
nffirmatin• recovery was obtained.
\Vlu•re th0 affirmatiYP reconry was 0htained h>·
the dC>fendant hut the court, on its own motion,
granted n new trial nnless within 10 days the def Pn<lant sho11ld file his consent to a specified rrdnction ill recowry, it \\·as held that the fact that
withill thr 10-(lny neriod the dPfenclant filed hiR
mot ion to Ret asi<le the conditional order operated
to liolll that order in abeyance until the trial on the
mot ion, and lw did pass on it 5 months later.
1ri:tl
11

Tn 1lu1t case the order of the court was that the new
11 ;1"

11nt QTantrd or denied until after the expiration

f 1n da \·-; anrl unlrss tlw clef endant consented to a

l'l'd11dion on l'<'<'OYCl')". !fonce the court had not finall)T
r /ispu~·"d () r t lw ma ttc•r 1111 ti l the condition had heen met
11

r 11ot llll'I.

13

JI arris v. 8 peers, op cit., is not in point or r 1. ,
r ctt1r,1
to the case on appeal herein because it also illroln;\
conditional order.
'
In view of the law arnl facts of the instant r·:!,,
appellant urges that the trial court properlv ~O'J'"I lt('I(,
defendant's motion for a new trial. Once lJa,:inO' liP• ,
and granted. defendant's motion, the mattrr wa~ i]j,
posed of and thr court erred in intervening a])(l grrn,t
[ng plaintiff's motion to vacate the order grm 1 t 111 ~
defendant a ne'v trial. Plaintiff's relief from the onlr·i
granting a new trial was to the Supreme Comt m11l 111,1
the trial court.
•

Cl

,-,

u]I(

POINT III
THE DAMAGES HELD BY THE COFRT
UPON IT'S RECONSIDERATION OF IT~
DECISION WERE EXCESSIVE.
The trial of this case was not a very complif'nfr,1
one and was disposed of in about one da~·. After ]1Pnrin~
all of the evidence and while it was fresh iu his mi111I '
the trial judge ruled from the bench granting jndg-rne111
in favor of plaintiff for special damages in the snm oi'
$126.00 and general damages in the sum of $2,000.00
Two <lays later after having mulled thr matter onr tlw
trial judge increased the general damag0 to a sum nf
$4,800.00 on an increase of approximately· 240S1c · ~\1,- '
pellant has already· pointed out that it is its po~itini,
that the trial conrt ened in cb~m;ing its earl~- dr·r·i•ionthc tremendo11s iner0nl'e in 11H. 52'C'11crnl damru~l'~ nft"'
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, ••

,

uit lrnd n·<·n11sidered ihc evidence and issues. This

1

,,,, 1\ I, wl:c:
".'iili nl'
, ,
11

iii('

ii:-,

rm to h1·/ievC' that the great inereasC' was a

prejudice or passion. The hC'st evidence of the

n·d rn hw of tlit• ge11c>ral damages to he awarded Ji~·

:ri:d ,i1Hlg(' 1d1en thP matter \\·as fresh ill his mind,

ili:i1 ii', on tlH• daY of the trial.

_\p]wlln111 incorporat0s into Poillt III all of the
iir·ilr-f~
l)ui11t~

n111l applicable factual facts in law discussed in
I nnd II of this Brief. That hy reason of the

i·\n·~sin

nmonnt of th(• gc>neral damages over the

nn~i11:d rrnlnntion of the case the grounds for a reri·N1l
1

nrnl for remanding the matter into the District

'onrt or n new trial or rPinstatement for the orig1.nal

il1('1~io11

of the trinl C'Ourt.

CONCLUSION
Rasrd on the forrgoing argument and authorities
:i

nppenrs rlPnr that this court should revise the decision

1n 1.1 jl!dgTM11t of the District Conrt and remand the case
Ir:

thr T>i,;trici Conrt for rrim:tatcm0nt of the original

d 1:('i~i1;11 of thr

Court or for the gTanting of a new trial.
H1•spectfu1ly submitted,

KIPP AND CHARLIER
TEL CHARLTER, Esq.
:'>20 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorney for Defendant
and Appellant
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